Insurance and the Utilization of Medical Services by Jonathan Meer & Harvey S. Rosen
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We are grateful to Jeffrey Kling, Douglas Miller, Adriana Lleras-Muney and two referees for useful
suggestions and to Princeton’s Center for Economic Policy Studies for financial support. The views expressed
herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research
©2003 by Jonathan Meer and Harvey S. Rosen.   All rights reserved. Short sections of text not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is
given to the source.Insurance and the Utilization of Medical Services
Jonathan Meer and Harvey S. Rosen




Most data sets indicate a positive correlation between having health insurance and utilizing health
care services. Yet the direction of causality is not at all clear. If we ob-serve a positive correlation
between the utilization of health care services and insurance status, we do not know if this is because
people who anticipate poor health buy more in-surance (or take jobs with generous medical
coverage), or because insurance lowers the cost of health care, increasing the quantity demanded.
While a few attempts have been made to implement an instrumental variables (IV) strategy to deal
with endogeneity, the instruments chosen have not been entirely convinc-ing. In this paper we revisit
the IV estimation of the reduced form relationships between insurance and health care utilization
taking advantage of what we argue is a good instru-ment - the individual's self-employment status.
Our main finding is that a positive and statistically significant effect of insurance continues to obtain
even after instrumenting. Indeed, instrumental variables estimates of the impact of insurance on
utilization of a variety of health care services are larger than their non-instrumented counterparts.
The validity of this exercise depends on the extent to which self-employment status is a suitable
instrument. To argue this case, we analyze panel data on transitions from wage-earning into self-
employment and show that individuals who select into self-employment do not differ systematically
from those who remain wage-earners with re-spect to either the utilization of health care or health
status. While this finding does not prove that self-employment status is an appropriate instrument,
it is encouraging that there appear to be no underlying differences that might lead to self-
employment per se affecting health services utilization.
Jonathan Meer Harvey S. Rosen
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Stanford University Princeton University
Stanford, CA 94305 Princeton, NJ 08544
jmeer@stanford.edu and NBER
hsr@princeton.eduYou’d better have some medical insurance or you’re gonna die.  That’s right.  
Everybody says, oh, you’ve got to eat right, exercise.  No, you don’t.  You need 
some coverage. 
    - - C h r i s   R o c k  
 
1. INTRODUCTION   
 
    The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) sponsors a web site called Cov-
ering the Uninsured (CoveringTheUninsured.org).  The top of the home page delivers 
this message:  “When you’re uninsured, life turns out differently.”  In the center of the 
page is a picture of a downcast little girl.  The text to the left of the girl states, “Her mom 
gets cancer.  They find the tumor early.  Her mom is OK.”  To the right it says, “Her 
mom gets cancer.  She’s diagnosed too late.  Her mom is gone.”  The point is clear:  
Health insurance increases an individual’s utilization of health care services which, in 
turn, leads to better health care outcomes.  The RWJF web site certainly reflects the con-
ventional wisdom in policy debates about health insurance. 
There are two links in the causal chain of the conventional wisdom, from insur-
ance to the utilization of health care services, and from utilization to health status.  This 
paper focuses on the first link.  A number of previous papers have examined the relation-
ship between insurance status and health services utilization. Most have been observa-
tional studies, which analyze outcome differences between insured and uninsured popula-
tions. These papers generally show that having insurance increases the utilization of 
health care services (Brown et al. (1998)).  However, Levy and Meltzer (2001) note that 
observational studies “are hopelessly confounded by both observable and unobservable 
differences between patients who do and do not have health insurance.”  For the usual 
reasons, this can lead to inconsistent estimates of the impact of insurance coverage on 
health care utilization.      2 
More generally, as Gruber (2000) points out, “insurance coverage itself may be a 
function of health status, leading to endogeneity bias in estimates of the effects of insur-
ance on health and the utilization of medical care.”  However, the direction of the bias is 
not clear a priori.  Anticipation of relatively high utilization of medical services might 
lead an individual to seek insurance, which would tend to impart an upward bias to the 
estimated impact of insurance on utilization.  On the other hand, insurers may be able to 
identify people who will be intensive users of medical services and either decline to offer 
insurance or charge such a high price that they do not purchase it.  An anecdote along 
these lines appeared recently in the Wall Street Journal (April 9, 2002).  The story con-
cerned a woman who had been paying $417 per month for health insurance, but whose 
rate increased to $1,881 per month after she was diagnosed with breast cancer.  To the 
extent the tendencies present in the story are typical, the estimated impact of insurance is 
biased downwards. 
In this paper, we examine the link between insurance and the utilization of health 
care services using an  instrumental variables (IV) strategy to estimate the reduced form 
relationship between insurance and health care utilization.  We take advantage of what 
we argue is a good instrument – the individual’s self-employment status.  Section 2 de-
scribes the construction of the data set, which is drawn from the 1996 through 1998 
waves of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).  Section 3 discusses economet-
ric issues and presents the results.  We find that IV estimates of the impact of insurance 
on the utilization of a variety of health care services are greater than estimates that ignore 
endogeneity.  
Of course, the validity of these results depends on the extent to which self-   3 
employment status is a suitable instrument.  Section 4 discusses the case for this instru-
mentation strategy.  The centerpiece of this discussion is the analysis of panel data on 
transitions from wage-earning into self-employment.  We  show that individuals who se-
lect into self-employment do not differ systematically from those who remain wage-
earners with respect to the utilization of health care and health status.  That is, there ap-
pear to be no underlying differences that might lead to self-employment per se affecting 
health services utilization.  Section 5 discusses the possibility that, regardless of the effect 
on utilization, lack of insurance presents serious financial difficulties.  Again instrument-
ing using self-employment status, we find that this is generally not the case, although the 
evidence is mixed.  Section 6 concludes with a summary and suggestions for future re-
search. 
 
2.  DATA 
  The data for this paper are drawn from the 1996, 1997 and 1998 waves of the 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which has individual-level information on 
insurance coverage, utilization of health services, health status and self-employment 
status.  The three waves consist of two overlapping two-year panels.  We exclude persons 
younger than 18 and older than 62 in 1996.  Those under 18 are unlikely to have a strong 
connection to the labor market, and those over 62 are facing retirement and have different 
health care options. This leaves us with a sample of 37,331 observations, comprising 
23,851 individuals, of whom 9.27 percent are self-employed. There are more observa-
tions than individuals because most people were followed for two years.    
Each year, respondents are asked about their insurance status, utilization of health 
care, and a variety of other questions.  Certain utilization questions, asked yearly, are not    4 
asked in 1997, and some questions deal with tests and procedures that are  appropriate for 
only one gender or the other.  Therefore, some models are not estimated with the entire 
sample.   
  The MEPS provides information on the utilization of a variety of health care ser-
vices.  They include visits to providers (such as physicians and dentists) and preventative 
care (such as blood pressure checks, flu shots, physicals, and breast exams).  Respondents 
are asked at the end of the year if, for example, they visited a doctor or had a mammo-
gram in that year.  The insurance question is similarly asked on an annual basis.  Subjects 
are also asked whether the insurance is public or private, and whether it is provided by 
the employer or self-provided.  If the individual has any kind of policy, we characterize 
him or her as being insured.  Further, we construe an individual as being insured if the 
source of insurance is the spouse. 
A description of the variables used in this analysis and the associated summary 
statistics can be found in Table 1.  There is substantial variation in the utilization rates for 
various medical services.  About 65 percent of the sample visited the office of a health 
care provider during the year; 43 percent had a physical exam; 72 percent had their blood 
pressure checked; but only 18 percent had a flu shot.   
 
3.  ANALYSIS 
  3.1 Preliminary Issues 
  We wish to estimate how a variety of medical services utilization measures de-
pend on insurance status and other covariates.  In our models of the utilization of various 
health care services, the dependent variable, Y, takes a value of one if the individual used 
the service in question during that year, and zero otherwise.  The independent variables in    5 
our basic model include an indicator variable for insurance status (Ins), region, family 
size, age, age-squared, gender, race, and education.  We only include covariates that are 
very likely to be exogenous.  Age clearly affects both health and utilization (Lakdawlka 
and Philipson (1998)), and education has been linked with both health and ability to pay 
(Taubman and Rosen (1982)).  Race (Kass, Weinick, and Monheit (1996)), region (Skin-
ner and Wennberg (1998)), family size (Taubman and Rosen (1982)), and gender (Ver-
brugge (1985)) have all been shown to have important effects on the variables of interest.  
Year effects are also included.  We use the conventional probit model: 
(1)  Pr(Y = 1)  =  Ф[α 0 + α 1(Ins) + α 2(X) + ε ] 
where X is the vector of exogenous covariates, ε  is the error term, and Ф[•] is the cumula-
tive normal distribution.  In computing confidence intervals for our parameter estimates, 
we wish to account for possible within-individual correlation of the errors and right hand 
side variables.   To do this, we perform a clustered procedure,  with all years of an indi-
vidual serving as the cluster. 
  To begin, we estimate the model without any correction for the endogeneity of 
insurance.  The results, presented in Table 2, show that insurance has a positive and sig-
nificant effect on most measures of utilization.  (Only the coefficients and t-statistics for 
the insurance variable are presented.  The estimated coefficients on the other covariates 
are available on request.)  For example, having insurance increases the probability of vis-
iting an office-based care provider by 24.9 percentage points.  Insurance also increases 
the likelihood of having a physical exam, mammogram, and a variety of other preventive 
procedures by as much as 25 percentage points.  One cannot reject the hypothesis that it 
has no effect on visiting a chiropractor or using alternate care.  This is unsurprising:  in-   6 
surance plans rarely cover these services, so it stands to reason that it should have no ef-
fect on their utilization.  Insurance also has a statistically significant effect on hospital 
usage:  3.3 percentage points for overnight stays and 0.37 percentage points for outpatient 
visits.  These figures are substantial given the small baseline proportions of hospital vis-
its.  (See Table 1). 
  However, as noted above, insurance status may well be endogenous to utilization 
decisions.  To deal with this in an IV framework requires an instrument that is well corre-
lated with the endogenous variable but not with the error term in the second stage (Bound 
et al. (1993)).  The individual’s self-employment status seems to fit the criteria for a good 
instrument.  There is good reason to believe that the individual’s self-employment status 
is correlated with whether or not he or she has insurance.  In particular, several previous 
studies have shown that there is a strong negative correlation between self-employment 
and medical insurance (Health Insurance Association of American (2000); Perry and 
Rosen (2001b)).   
In this context, though, one should note that the self-employed are not a homoge-
neous group with respect to the institutional environments in which they function.  They 
operate in different organizational forms – sole proprietorships, partnerships, and corpo-
rations – and the probability of being insured could vary with organizational form.  In 
particular, those who are incorporated might be more likely to have insurance for two 
reasons.  First, their expenditures for health insurance are fully deductible;  for members 
of partnerships and sole proprietors, they are not (at least during our sample period).  
Second, to the extent that corporate enterprises have more employees, the owners can    7 
purchase insurance at advantageous group rates.
1  Indeed, in our data, self-employed in-
dividuals who are organized as corporations have an insurance rate of 89.5 percent, as 
compared with 67.2 percent for sole proprietors and 71.3 percent for partners.  Hence, 
organizational form potentially provides useful information, so instead of characterizing 
self-employment status by a single dichotomous variable, we use three, one for each of 
the organizational forms.  The omitted group consists of all individuals who are not self-
employed, that is, wage earners and the unemployed.
2  In our sample 2.6 percent of the 
individuals have incorporated businesses, 5.7 percent are sole proprietors, and 0.97 per-
cent are in partnerships, for a total of 9.27 percent self-employed.
3   
The other key issue in assessing the adequacy of self-employment status as an in-
strument is whether it exerts an independent effect on health care utilization.  While there 
is no obvious reason that this should be the case, a possible problem is that there might be 
unobservable differences between wage earners and the self-employed that affect utiliza-
tion and health.  Perhaps people who are too unhealthy to hold jobs as wage-earners opt 
for self-employment.  Alternatively, some sort of ‘animal spirit’ may drive both health 
and the propensity to be self-employed.  Previous research using a variety of data sets has 
addressed this issue, and shown that neither health status nor utilization of health care 
services is a good predictor of whether or not a wage-earner will make a transition to self-
                                                 
1 See Thomasson [2000] on the advantages of group coverage. 
2 Grouping the unemployed together with wage-earners may be problematic, so we also estimate our mod-
els including a dichotomous variable equal to one if the individual is not employed and zero otherwise.  
This has no impact on our results.  To explore this issue further, we simply exclude the unemployed en-
tirely from the sample. This exclusion similarly leaves our results unchanged. 
3 An interesting question is whether the differences in insurance rates by organizational form translate into 
differences in the utilization of health care services.  To investigate this question,  we estimate a series of 
reduced form regressions, essentially substituting the self-employment variables for insurance status in 
Equation (1).   The results, available upon request, show that incorporated individuals generally do not dif-
fer greatly from wage earners in their utilization of medical services, whereas sole proprietors and partners    8 
employment (Holtz-Eakin, Rosen, and Penrod (1996) and Perry and Rosen (2001a)).  We 
update these results in Section 5 and confirm that they hold in our data – there is no selec-
tion on the basis of health-related variables.  This exercise does not constitute a formal 
test for the adequacy of self-employment as an instrument; indeed, no such test exists.  
That said, while these findings cannot definitely exclude the possibility of unobservable 
heterogeneity, they certainly provide no support for the notion that people who select into 
self-employment are systematically different with respect to health-related attributes.  
3.2  Instrumental Variables Estimates 
  As usual, we implement the two-stage estimation procedure by first estimating a 
reduced form regression of insurance status on all the covariates of the model.  Impor-
tantly, in this first-stage regression, one can strongly reject the joint hypothesis that the 
three self-employment variables have zero coefficients.  Indeed, the associated F-statistic, 
219.8, more than satisfies the usual criteria for an adequate fit in the first stage (Cawley 
(2000)).  Moreover, for each health service, an overidentification test cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments.
4  While this, in itself, does not prove 
that the instruments are good, it does indicate that they do not belong on the right-hand 
side of the equation themselves. 
The next step is to estimate the probit equation (1) using the fitted values of the 
insurance variable from the first stage.  Rivers and Vuong (1988) and others have dis-
cussed the issues that arise in obtaining consistent standard errors within this framework.  
                                                                                                                                                 
tend to utilize medical services less than wage earners.  This is more or less what one would expect given 
the pattern of insurance coverage across the organizational forms.   
4 For example, for office-based provider visits, the chi-square test with two degrees of freedom is 3.91, 
which is significant only at the 0.14 level.    9 
The most straightforward solution is to compute bootstrapped standard errors.
5  The boot-
strap is based on random sampling;  if the data are heteroscedastic, then each sample will 
have a different distribution, resulting in inconsistent point estimates and standard errors 
(Efron (1979)).  To investigate whether this is a problem in our data, we estimate the 
bootstrapped model several dozen times to see if the results change substantially.  They 
do not, and we conclude that the data are unlikely to be sufficiently heteroscedastic to 
render the bootstrap algorithm unreliable. 
Table 3 reports the marginal effects for the bootstrapped two-stage probit model.
6  
Comparing these results to their counterparts in Table 2, we see that, in general, instru-
menting for insurance in the utilization equations increases the magnitude of its effect.  
For example, the effect of insurance on visiting an office-based provider increases from 
24.9 percentage points to 35.2 percentage points.  The change between the two specifica-
tions is even more pronounced for the preventative care measures.  The insurance effect 
on the probability of having a cholesterol check, for example, increases by 22 percentage 
points.  It appears, then, that ignoring endogeneity leads to underestimates of the impact 
of insurance coverage on utilization.  As noted earlier, this is consistent with a scenario in 
which individuals who are likely to be intensive users of health services find themselves 
discouraged from obtaining insurance for any of a variety of reasons. 
                                                 
5 As noted above, we perform a clustered procedure to allow for the possibility of within-individual correla-
tion of the errors.  To implement this in a bootstrapping context, we first create a list of individuals.  For 
each bootstrap iteration, we then draw a set of individuals from this list, and use all years of data from the 
selected individuals to construct that iteration’s dataset.   
6 Two-stage probit coefficients were calculated using a Stata module developed by Jonah Gelbach of the 
University of Maryland.    10 
  3.3 Alternative Specifications 
We have shown that when one takes into account the endogeneity of insurance 
status, the magnitude of the insurance effect on the utilization of a variety of health care 
services increases.  We estimate a number of variations on our basic model in order to 
assess the robustness of these results. 
3.3.1 Income 
A positive correlation between health status and income is well-documented, but 
the direction of causation is controversial.  (See, for example, Feinstein (1993), Smith 
and Kington (1997),  and Smith (1999)).  In light of this controversy, we choose not to 
include income as a right-hand side variable in our basic models.  However, given the 
widespread belief that low income leads to less or lower quality medical care, it seems 
worthwhile to re-estimate the model including family income as a covariate.  The IV re-
sults, available upon request, indicate that none of our substantive findings changes.   
In connection with income, an intriguing finding from the Rand experiment 
(Newhouse (1993)) is that changes in the extent of insurance coverage have some impact 
on the health status of low-income people, but not for the rest of the population.  In our 
context, this suggests that one might want to estimate a model that includes an interaction 
between insurance status and an indicator for whether or not the individual has a low in-
come.  We create a dichotomous variable that equals one if the individual’s family in-
come is in the bottom quartile, and augment our basic models from Table 3 with both this 
indicator variable and its interaction with insurance status.  We find that the interaction 
term is negative for most health services, and generally statistically insignificant or only 
marginally significant.  Most importantly, including the interaction term does not affect    11 
our substantive results with respect to insurance and the utilization of various health ser-
vices. 
3.3.2 Marital  Status 
It is easy to imagine that marital status affects health-related outcomes.  Married 
people may have more stable home environments,  better diets, and so on.  However, it is 
equally easy to imagine that the direction of causality runs the other way.  For example, 
healthy people may be more likely to find mates than unhealthy people (Goldman 
(2001)).  Because of the possibility of joint determination, we leave marital status out of 
our basic model.  But marital status has been included in other studies (e.g., Gruber and 
Madrian (2002)), so it seems instructive to estimate a set of models that include a di-
chotomous marriage indicator.  The results, available upon request, are neither qualita-
tively nor quantitatively very different from those of the basic model.   
3.3.3 Econometric  Specification 
A possible problem with our results is that they are a consequence of the particu-
lar assumptions underlying the two-stage probit model.  In the probit model, the two-
stage procedure generates consistent estimates only if the error terms in both the first- and 
second-stage equations are jointly normally distributed, and both equations are correctly 
specified.  In a linear probability model, the conditions for consistency are less stringent – 
the right hand variables in the first-stage equation have to be uncorrelated with the error 
term in the second-stage equation, but consistent estimates may be obtained even if some 
variables that belong in the first-stage equation are omitted.  Therefore, despite the well-
known limitations of the linear probability model, it seems worthwhile to use it to check 
our estimates.       12 
The results, reported in Table 4, are very similar to those obtained using the pro-
bit.  For example, in Table 3 the insurance effect on the probability of visiting an office- 
based provider is 35 percentage points; in Table 4 it is 31 percentage points.  Thus, we 
feel confident that our results are not an artifact of the assumptions behind the two-stage 
probit model. 
 
4.  TRANSITIONS INTO SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
As suggested above, some unobserved variable might drive both health status and 
self-employment decisions.  One can imagine, for example, that  relatively unhealthy 
people are unable to hold jobs and hence enter self-employment.  Alternatively, perhaps 
healthy, energetic people are particularly well-suited for running their own businesses. To 
the extent that either type of selection takes place, self-employment status is not a suit-
able instrument. 
Examining the determinants of transitions from wage earning into self-
employment can be instructive in ascertaining whether some underlying variable drives 
both health and self-employment status.  Consider a group of wage-earners during a 
given time period.  If the probability that an individual in this group transits to self-
employment in the subsequent period is independent of his or her health status at the out-
set, then one can feel some confidence that selection into self-employment on the basis of 
health is not driving our results.  On the other hand, if healthier or less healthy individuals 
are more likely to make transitions into self-employment, the interpretation of our find-
ings becomes problematic.  Using data from the Survey of Program Participation and the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Holtz-Eakin, Penrod and Rosen (1996) find no evi-
dence for this latter hypothesis.  Similarly, Perry and Rosen’s (2001a) analysis of the    13 
1996 and 1997 MEPS data suggests that the absence of health differences between wage 
earners and the self-employed does not appear to be due to the fact that people with rela-
tively good health tend to select into self-employment. 
In this section, we update these analyses and examine whether the results hold for 
the sample of individuals used in this study.  Specifically, the overlapping two-year struc-
ture of the MEPS allows us to construct a pooled data set for two sets of transitions, from 
1996 to 1997 and 1997 to 1998.  There are 19,744 individuals with two years of complete 
data.  Approximately 1 percent of wage earners leave their jobs in each year to become 
self-employed.   
We model the probability that an individual who is a wage-earner in year t-1 
makes a transition to self-employment in period t.  The sample consists of individuals 
who are wage-earners in year t-1.  The dependent variable is an indicator variable for 
whether the individual is self-employed (in any organizational form) in year t.
7  The 
right-hand side includes the covariates used in our canonical model dated year t-1, a time 
effect to take into account any systematic differences between the two transition periods, 
and some measure of the individual’s health status and/or utilization of health services in 
year t-1. 
Row (1) of Table 5 shows the results when self-reported health status is included 
on the right hand side; row (2) when an indicator variable for an office visit to a health-
care provider is included; and row (3) when both are included.  None of the health-related 
variables is significant in any of the specifications, and all are minuscule in magnitude.  
For example, the point estimate in row (1) suggests that being in good health makes one 
                                                 
7 We also examine transitions from wage earning into particular organizational forms.  The results are not 
affected.    14 
only 0.06 percentage points more likely to make a transition into self-employment, and 
row (2) indicates that having paid a visit to a health-care provider makes one only 0.02 
percentage points more likely to make such a transition.  We find similar results when we 
use other measures of health care utilization.  In short, Table 5 confirms previous findings 
that neither health status nor health services utilization are predictors of whether wage-
earners will become self-employed.  This does not constitute a formal test that self-
employment status is a good instrument.   We are nevertheless encouraged that it appears 
unlikely that some variable is driving both health and the self-employment decision.  
 
5. EXPENDITURES 
We have shown that once simultaneity is taken into account, the impact of health 
insurance upon the use of a variety of health care services increases.  Our focus on this 
issue reflects perhaps the dominant issue in the public policy debate over the uninsured – 
their ability to obtain medical services.  However, the discussion over health care some-
times loses sight of the key function of insurance, namely, to spread consumption over 
different states of the world.  It is therefore important to ask whether, in the absence of 
insurance,  paying for health care leads to a serious reduction in a household’s standard of 
living.   
The MEPS includes information about out-of-pocket expenditures on health care.  
We wish to estimate how having insurance affects these expenditures, taking into account 
the endogeneity of insurance;  as before, we use a set of self-employment variables as 
instruments.  A sensible way to examine how health care expenditures affect the “stan-
dard of living” is to measure their magnitude relative to consumption expenditures.   
However, the MEPS does not include consumption information.  Hence, we use income,    15 
which is recorded in the survey.  We exclude families whose incomes are below $5,000 
from this analysis, as we suspect that income is transitorily very low or mismeasured for 
such families.   
To begin, we use ordinary least squares to estimate a regression with out-of-
pocket medical expenditures on the left-hand side, and insurance and the same exogenous 
covariates as in Table 2 on the right-hand side.  The coefficient on the insurance variable 
indicates that it reduces out-of-pocket medical expenditures by a mere $16.50 with a 
standard error of $12.20.  When the model is estimated using two-stage least squares, the 
effect increases substantially.  Having insurance lowers out-of-pocket medical expendi-
tures by $482 (s.e. = $176).  It may be more instructive, however, to examine expendi-
tures as a proportion of income.  When we estimate an ordinary least squares regression 
of the proportion of income on the same covariates as above,  we find that insurance re-
duces medical expenditures by 0.40 percent of income (s.e. = 0.065 percent). The two-
stage least squares estimate is a reduction of 0.58 percent of income with a standard error 
of 0.46 percent.  
These calculations suggest that out-of-pocket medical expenditures are, on aver-
age, not a large proportion of the incomes of the uninsured.
8  Nevertheless, they may be 
excessive for some of the uninsured.  To investigate this possibility, we create an indica-
tor that equals one if out-of-pocket expenditures as a proportion of income are greater 
than 20 percent and zero otherwise.  Conventional probit estimation indicates that having 
                                                 
8 An interesting question is whether this finding holds for individuals with particularly severe health problems.  
The MEPS indicates whether or not the individual has a “priority condition,” which is one of a number of serious 
illnesses such as cancer and heart disease.  When we interact a dichotomous variable for the presence of a prior-
ity condition with the insurance variable, the  IV estimate is -0.40 percentage points.  That is, for a person with a 
priority condition, not having insurance increases out-of-pocket expenditures relative to income by 0.40 percent-
age points.  However, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the interaction term is zero.  The main effect of hav-
ing a priority condition is 1.1 percentage points (s.e. = 0.78 percentage points).    16 
insurance reduces the probability of reaching this threshold by 0.51 percentage points 
(s.e. = 0.13 percentage points).  Instrumenting in a two-stage probit framework, we find 
that insurance reduces this probability by 2.3 percentage points, but with a standard error 
of 3.3 percentage points.  One cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect is equal to zero.  
On the other hand, given that only 0.65 percent of the sample experiences out-of-pocket 
expenditures greater than 20 percent of their incomes, the large standard error encom-
passes some potentially important changes in the probability of a serious diminution in a 
household’s standard of living.  While this calculation provides no strong evidence that 
such a phenomenon would occur, it is not inconsistent with a risk-aversion motive for 
purchasing health insurance.  In any case, taken together, the results in this section do not 
provide support for the notion that lack of insurance greatly increases out-of-pocket ex-
penditures relative to income.  This is not too surprising given our findings from Table 3, 
which indicate that the uninsured are less likely than the insured to consume a variety of 
health care services.   
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, we have examined the effect of 
health insurance on the utilization of health care services.  We began by replicating previ-
ous studies which show that insured individuals are more likely to utilize a variety of health 
care services than those who do not, ceteris paribus.  However, as several previous investi-
gators have pointed out, insurance status is likely to be an endogenous variable in this con-
text, so that attaching a causal interpretation to this statistical  relationship is problematic.  
We use an instrumental variables estimation strategy to address this problem, arguing that 
self-employment status is a suitable instrument.  Our main finding is that a positive and    17 
statistically significant effect of insurance is obtained even after instrumenting.  Indeed, 
instrumental variables estimates of the impact of insurance on utilization of a variety of 
health care services are larger than their non-instrumented counterparts.   
Given that this study is based upon data from the United States, which has a rather 
unique set of health care institutions, any generalization of our findings to other countries 
must be done with great caution.  That said, they might be of relevance to those nations 
that are debating whether or not to scale back their systems of universal health insurance.  
Specifically, to the extent that our results carry over to other countries, reforms that re-
duce the incidence of health insurance will also decrease the utilization of health care 
services.  In the same way, policies that increase the availability of health insurance will 
likely increase utilization of health care services and possibly health care costs. 
However, as suggested at the outset, utilization of health care services is not an 
end in itself.  Policymakers are concerned not only about the link between insurance and 
the utilization of health services, but also between insurance and health status.  Our find-
ing that insurance is associated with greater utilization of health care services does not 
necessarily imply that insurance leads to better health.  Some argue, for example, that ac-
cess to health care is responsible for only a relatively small part of health, with more im-
portant determinants being genetics, environment, and health behaviors (Institute for the 
Future (2000, p. 23)).   
Statistical examination of the links between insurance status and health comes up 
against an endogeneity problem much like the one involved in the analysis of utilization.  
In Meer and Rosen [2002], we use the same approach as in this paper to examine the rela-
tionship between insurance status and a self-reported measure of contemporaneous health 
status.  We find that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between health 
status and insurance in the data, but taking endogeneity into account renders the relation-   18 
ship statistically insignificant.  However, this result pertains to short-term effects of in-
surance on health status.  One can imagine that, after a number of years, the lower utiliza-
tion of health care services associated with the lack of insurance could cumulatively have 
a negative impact on health.  This observation is particularly cogent in light of our find-
ing in Table 3 that insurance coverage has a substantial impact on the utilization of a va-
riety of preventative care procedures.  An important topic for future research is explora-
tion of the long-term relationships among insurance, health care utilization, and health 
status.    19 
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Variable Description  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Office-Based Provider   Respondent had an office-based provider visit in the last year.  0.6517 0.4764 
Chiropractor   Respondent visited a chiropractor in the last year.  0.03662 0.1878 
Prescription  Respondent received a prescription for drugs in the last year.  0.6023 0.4894 
Alternate Care  Respondent used some form of alternate care (e.g. massage ther-
apy or acupuncture) in the last year.  0.05425 0.2265 
Night in Hospital  Respondent spent at least one night in a hospital in the last year.  0.05920 0.2360 
Outpatient Hospital 
Stay  Respondent had an outpatient visit to a hospital in the last year.  0.004768 0.06889 
Dentist   Respondent visited a dentist in the last year.  0.3728 0.4836 
Optometrist   Respondent visited an optometrist in the last year.  0.04642 0.2104 
Blood Pressure   Respondent had his or her blood pressure checked in the last year.  0.7227 0.4477 
Cholesterol Check  Respondent had his or her cholesterol level checked in the last 
year.  0.3938 0.4886 
Physical  Respondent had a physical in the last year.  0.4282 0.4948 
Flu Shot  Respondent had a flu shot in the last year.  0.1792 0.3835 
Prostate   Male respondent had a prostate exam in the last year.  0.2180 0.4129 
Breast   Female respondent had a breast exam in the last year.  0.6354 0.4813 
Mammogram  Female respondent had a mammogram in the last year.  0.5166 0.4998 
Pap Smear  Female respondent had a pap smear in the last year.  0.6221 0.4849 
Midwest  Respondent lives in the Midwest.  0.2227 0.4161 
South  Respondent lives in the south.  0.3535 0.4781 
West  Respondent lives in the west.  0.2405 0.4274 
Family Size  Respondent’s annualized family size.  3.212 1.603 
Male  Respondent is male.  0.5156 0.4998    22 
Black  Respondent is black.  0.1318 0.3383 
Other Race  Respondent is neither white nor black.  0.04682 0.2113 
GED  Respondent has a GED.  0.04762 0.2129 
High School Degree  Respondent has a high school degree.  0.5343 0.4988 
College Degree  Respondent has a college degree.  0.1591 0.3657 
Graduate Degree  Respondent has a graduate degree.  0.06982 0.2548 
Other Degree  Respondent has some other degree.  0.03807 0.1914 
Age  Respondent’s age.  38.15  11.68 
Log Family Income  Log of respondent’s annual family income.  10.67  0.8343 
Corporate  Respondent is self-employed and incorporated all year.  0.02604 0.1592 
Sole Proprietor  Respondent is self-employed and a sole proprietor all year.  0.05692 0.2317 
Partner  Respondent is self-employed and in a partnership all year.  0.009697 0.09799 
Insurance Status  Respondent is insured all year.  0.8244 0.3805 
 
 
These summary statistics are calculated from the MEPS for 1996 to 1998. Only individuals between the 
ages of 18 and 62 in 1996 are included.    23 
Table 2 
 Probit Estimates of Health Services Utilization (Marginal Effects) 
 
Dependent Variable  Sample Size  Insurance Effect 
Office-Based Provider   37583  0.2491 
(32.9)  
Chiropractor   37583  0.002425  
(0.860) 
Prescription 27249  0.2122  
(23.3)  
Alternate Care  22497  -0.003548  
(-0.910) 
Night in Hospital  37583  0.03286  
(10.5)  
Outpatient Hospital Stay  37583  0.003739  
(4.27) 
Dentist   37583  0.2021 
(27.0)  
Optometrist   37583  0.02398  
(8.38)  
Blood Pressure   22336  0.2004  
(23.5)  
Cholesterol Check  21977  0.1746  
(18.6)  
Physical 22269  0.1795  
(19.4)  
Flu Shot  21929  0.07298 
(10.2)  
Prostate Exam  10117  0.1294  
(11.8)  
Breast Exam  11073  0.2327  
(17.0) 
Mammogram 5096  0.2575  
(11.3)  
Pap Smear  11081  0.2289  
(16.7)  
 
Figures show the effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1 in insurance coverage for the whole year.  Each 
coefficient is from a probit equation in which the left-hand side variable is the variable in the associated 
row, and the other right-hand side variables include:  region, family size, race, sex, education, age, age 
squared, and year effects. t-statistics are in parentheses. Those estimates significant at the 5 percent level 
are italicized.    24 
Table 3 
Two-Stage Probit Estimates of Health Services Utilization (Marginal Effects) 
 
Dependent Variable  Sample Size  Insurance Estimate 
Office-Based Provider   37331  0.3517 
(5.45)  
Chiropractor   37331  -0.1591  
(-2.65)  
Prescription 27077  0.3541 
(4.69)  
Alternate Care  22340  -0.3198 
(-3.65)  
Night in Hospital  37331  0.05369  
(3.84)  
Outpatient Hospital Stay  37331  0.0066395  
(0.366) 
Dentist   37331  0.2076  
(4.30)  
Optometrist   37331  0.03790  
(3.10)  
Blood Pressure   22177  0.5194 
(7.10)  
Cholesterol Check  21818  0.3989  
(9.74)  
Physical 22110  0.3769  
(7.40)  
Flu Shot  21776  0.2270  
(11.0)  
Prostate Exam  10062  0.2301  
(6.84)  
Breast Exam  10977  0.4383  
(3.35) 
Mammogram 5060  0.3301  
(2.40)  
Pap Smear  10985  0.3787 
(2.76)  
 
Figures show the effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1 in insurance coverage for the whole year. Each 
coefficient is from a probit equation in which the left-hand side variable is the variable in the associated 
row, and the other right-hand side variables include:  region, family size, race, sex, education, age, age 
squared, and year effects.  The instruments for insurance are indicators for operating as a corporation, sole 
proprietor, or partner.  t-statistics are in parentheses, for bootstrapped standard errors. Those estimates sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level  are italicized.     25 
Table 4 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of Health Services Utilization (Marginal Effects) 
 
Dependent Variable  Sample Size  Insurance Estimate 
Office-Based Provider   37331  0.3143 
(5.40)  
Chiropractor   37331  -0.1245  
(-3.57)  
Prescription 27077  0.3249 
(4.44)  
Alternate Care  22340  -0.2214  
(-4.68)  
Night in Hospital  37331  0.06742  
(2.71)  
Outpatient Hospital Stay  37331  0.01106  
(1.72)  
Dentist   37331  0.2001  
(3.37) 
Optometrist   37331  0.05091  
(2.19)  
Blood Pressure   22177  0.4577  
(6.06)  
Cholesterol Check  21818  0.4827  
(6.29)  
Physical 22110  0.4140  
(5.34)  
Flu Shot  21776  0.3744  
(6.15)  
Prostate Exam  10062  0.3363  
(4.50)  
Breast Exam  10977  0.4308  
(3.01) 
Mammogram 5060  0.3175  
(2.08)  
Pap Smear  10985  0.3747  
(2.57)  
 
Figures are the effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1 in insurance coverage for the whole year.  Each coef-
ficient is from a linear probability model in which the left-hand side variable is the variable in the associ-
ated row, and the other right-hand side variables include:  region, family size, race, sex, education, age, age 
squared, and year effects.  The instruments for insurance are indicators for operating as a corporation, sole 
proprietor, or partner. t-statistics are in parentheses. Those estimates significant at the 5 percent level are 
italicized.    26 
Table 5 
Probit Estimates of Transitions into Self-Employment (Marginal Effects) 
 
Specification Sample  Size Health  Status  Office Based Provider Visit 
1 12974  0.0005902 
(0.201)  - 
2 12974 -  0.0001546 
(0.0850) 





Each coefficient is from a probit equation in which the left-hand side variable is the probability of being 
self-employed in year t, and on the right-hand side are the following variables dated period t-1:  region, 
family size, race, sex, education, age, and age squared.  The sample consists only of those individuals who 
were wage-earners in period t-1.  Hence, each coefficient shows the probability of making a transition from 
wage-earning to self-employment, ceteris paribus.  Coefficients are the effect of a discrete change from 0 
to 1 for the indicator variables for initial health status and for whether the individual visited a health ser-
vices provider. t-statistics are in parentheses. Those coefficients significant at the 5% level are italicized.  
 
 
 